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TRANSFORMING FREE SPEECH: THE AMBIGUOUS LEGACY OF CIVIL
LIBERTARIANISM. By Mark A. Graber. Berkeley: University of California Press. 1991. Pp. xi, 336. $39.95.
In Transforming Free Speech, his first book, Mark A. Graber1
challenges what he calls "the Myth of the Worthy Tradition" of contemporary civil libertarianism (p. 3). Graber sketches a critical history of American intellectuals' defenses of expression rights since the
late nineteenth century, arguing that the generation of post-World
War I civil libertarians galvanized by Professor Zechariah Chafee, Jr.
effectively suppressed the contributions of its conservative libertarian
and radical predecessors. He contends that this suppression has left
contemporary free speech advocates ill-equipped to address issues implicating both expression rights and resource allocation, such as campaign finance reform and media access, which stand among the most
important contemporary free speech problems. Finally, he provides a
blueprint for a modified civil libertarian defense of speech designed to
encompass these key issues while vindicating the contributions of preWorld War I libertarians. Despite its occasionally underdeveloped
treatments of complex topics, Graber's book makes a compelling historical and legal case that adds an important critical perspective to the
litei;ature on the development of expression rights.
Graber begins his argument with a sympathetic portrait of the conservative libertarian defense of free speech, stressing that "[a] commitment to individual freedom from state regulation" (p. 19) led late
nineteenth century conservative libertarians, such as John W. Burgess,
Herbert Spencer, and William Graham Sumner, to advocate free
speech rights as vigorously as they championed laissez-faire property
rights (pp. 18-21). Graber contends that the defense of free speech
that the conservative libertarians developed - based on their narrow
readings of congressional and state power to infringe individual liberty
under the Constitution - belied the need for the innovations that progressive civil libertarians claimed were necessary to vindicate radicals'
expression rights during World War I and the Red Scare (p. 40).
Graber contends that progressive thinkers of the early twentieth
century set the stage for a· new defense of expression rights by denying
the premises of conservative libertarianism (pp. 50-121). That era's
leftist libertarians, led by Emma Goldman and Theodore Schroeder,
rejected the conservative libertarians' advocacy of property rights (pp.
53-65), while its new intellectuals, notably John Dewey and Roscoe
Pound, recast rights as means to sociological ends rather than libertarian ends in themselves (pp. 65-74). But these thinkers failed to gener1. Assistant Professor of Government, University of Texas.
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ate a widely accepted new judicial defense of expression rights; Graber
argues that progressive ideas actually hindered development of such a
defense by endorsing increased legislative power to effect social reforms, leaving such progressive jurists as Justice Brandeis to tie their
support for free speech to the Supreme Court's extreme solicitude for
property rights in such cases as Lochner v. New York 2 The end of that
solicitude would doom this brittle basis for upholding expression
rights (pp. 120-21).
,
Into the theoretical breach stepped Professor Chafee, Graber's primary villain, with a defense of free speech that found independent constitutional support for expression rights based primarily upon the
societal interest in facilitating democratic participation. 3 Graber
sternly criticizes Chafee's methodology: he charges that Chafee "suppressed or distorted evidence that strengthened the conservative libertarian interpretation of the liberty of discussion" (p. 127) while toning
down his own progressive philosophical views for the benefit of the
conservative judicial establishment (pp. 126-40). On a theoretical
level, Graber complains that Chafee's reliance on the law of criminal
attempts as a model for his free speech jurisprudence unnecessarily
narrowed protections for expression rights (pp. 147-51). More centrally, Graber laments Chafee's categorical distinction between democratic processes, which for Chafee were properly subject to judicial
oversight, and substantive economic policies, which were not, for inhibiting the development of free speech doctrine (pp. 151-64).
This distinction, Graber believes, left civil libertarians powerless to
invoke judicial action against the material inequalities that have
threatened open political discussion in the late twentieth century (pp.
165-69). He asserts that the process-policy dichotomy has prevented
leading free speech advocates Alexander Meiklejohn and Thomas
Emerson, despite their libertarian advances and criticisms of Chafee,
from developing useful ideas about issues that combine concerns about
expression rights and material inequalities (pp. 169-80). While the
Burger Court frequently invoked property rights against calls for
equalization of important opportunities for political participation striking down federal limits on individual campaign contributions,4 affirming free speech rights for corporations, 5 and denying constitu2. 198 U.S. 45 (1905); see pp. 112-21. Graber's characterization of Brandeis' position as a
reflexive retreat into stare decisis, pp. 101.03, may be unfair. Graber's own account supports the
possibility that Brandeis may have held a principled view that, if the Court intended to defend
economic liberties, it could hardly do less for expression rights. See pp. 118-20 (describing Brandeis' judicial activism on behalf of expression rights).
3. Pp. 122-26; see ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREEDOM OF SPEECH (1920). The judicial
foundation for Chafee's analysis was Justice Holmes' statement that the Constitution protected
statements about matters of public importance unless they posed a "clear and present danger" of
some social evil. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919); pp. 122-23.
4. P. 190. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
5. P. 191. See First Natl. Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
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tional rights of access to mass media6 - civil libertarians remained
preoccupied with less important disputes about when the government
may regulate objectionable speech (pp. 198-206). The only civil libertarian discussion of the relationship between resources and expression
rights has focused on the absolute question: Is money speech? Graber
doubts that such an inquiry can lead to a coherent theory for adjudicating current free speech controversies (pp. 206-15).
Graber closes Transforming Free Speech with the blueprint for his
own "somewhat new defense" of expression rights (pp. 216-34). He
asserts that "libertarians['] . . . discussions of the central meaning of
the First Amendment should address those practices that presently
threaten most directly the system of freedom of expression" (p. 225), a
principle that currently directs attention to the question: "When is
money speech?" (p. 226; emphasis added). Graber's answer, set out
here in unsatisfyingly brief form, 7 takes its cue from Michael Walzer's
axiom that a society satisfies the demands of democracy ''when success
in one institutional setting isn't convertible into success in another." 8
Graber argues that the government "can never, or hardly ever, ban
any argument or any manner of presenting arguments on the grounds
of persuasiveness" (p. 230) but may "regulate the effect of material
inequalities on the marketplace of ideas" (p. 233) by enforcing ceilings
on campaign contributions and access rights for the materially disadvantaged (pp. 227-34).
Graber's account of free speech advocacy's historical development,
although deft and largely convincing, encompasses too many important figures too quickly to avoid leaving a few puzzling questions. His
real view of the conservative libertarian tradition remains obscure.
While not blindly fawning, 9 his praise for the conservative libertarians
is effusive. But his own defense of expression rights makes clear that
he favors a high degree of economic regulation inconsistent with the
conservative libertarian view. Part of the problem lies in Graber's inadequate attention to the severe injuries that burgeoning corporations
inflicted on Americans' welfare during the early twentieth century. 10
6. P. 192. See Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Natl. Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
7. Graber states that he will argue in greater detail for his own theory of free speech in a
future book. P. 234.
8. P. 227 (quoting Michael Walzer, Liberalism and the Art of Separation, 12 POL. THEORY
315, 321 (1984)).
9. See, e.g.• p. 24 (conceding that conservative libertarians displayed greater concern with
property rights of business interests than with expression rights); p. 37 (noting accord between
conservative academic writing on free speech and restrictive judicial holdings on expression
rights in the late nineteenth century). But Graber assigns at least partial blame for conservative
libertarians' weaker moments on expression rights to external circumstances. See p. 24 (discussing "the low salience of First Amendment issues in the Gilded Age"). This contention is disingenuous: any era stained by fewer than its share of expression rights controversies is more
probably an age of weak defenders of free speech than of extraordinarily tolerant governmental
or social institutions.
10. See, e.g., PAULL. MURPHY, THE MEANING OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH 129 (1972) (noting
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The abuses of unfettered capitalists rendered earlier conservative libertarian social justifications for property rights 11 untenable, and this failure must have considerably aided Chafee's denial of the movement's
importance.
At a deeper level, Graber never fully develops the connection he
appears to want to draw between the conservative libertarian tradition
and his own quite egalitarian vision of expression rights. Obviously,
the conservative libertarians shared Graber's desire to forge a theory
of expression rights in a context of ideas about material resources, but
they and he have reached divergent conclusions through different
methods. Graber considers the consequences of economic realities, 12
while the conservative libertarians asserted economic rights. If this is
the only link Graber sees, the conservative libertarians are merely an
important footnote to his history.
Conversely, Graber places too little emphasis on at least two
figures who provide interesting support for his own views: David
Riesman and Theodore Schroeder. Graber never mentions Riesman,
who anticipated Graber's criticisms' of the Holmes-Chafee clear-andpresent-danger approach in a series of articles in 1942. 13 The two
scholars' critiques of civil libertarian theory are harmonious: Riesman
complained that Holmes and Chafee paid too little attention to social
policy14 and called upon government not only to guarantee expression
rights but to provide facilities for their exercise. 15 Riesman's apparent
lack of influence may justify his absence from Graber's historical analysis, but his ideas make him an important forerunner of Graber's own
theory of expression rights.
Graber discusses Schroeder at some length (pp. 54-65) but dismisses his broad, antistatist conception of expression rights as "a path
not taken" (p. 65). This appears to be an accurate historical observation. But of all the thinkers Graber considers, Schroeder would seem
the most likely to endorse Graber's own approach to expression rights,
the appeal of 1920s civil libertarians to "the depressed classes, primarily industrial workers").
For a discussion of the danger that monied interests came to pose to free speech itself, see
THOMAS I. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF TIIE FIRST AMENDMENT 105·06
(1966) (arguing that modern capacities for private interference with expression rights require
government restriction).
11. For an example of such a justification, see p. 20 (noting conservative libertarian belief
that "government had to permit and protect even substantial accumulations of corporate wealth
.•. to finance the major projects necessary for realizing truth in the modern world").
12. See p. 225 (''This emphasis on actual threats to the system of freedom of expression
requires some empirical research.").
13. See, e.g., David Riesman, Civil Liberties in a Period of Transition, in 3 PUB. POLY. 33 (C.
J. Friedrich & Edward S. Mason eds., 1942). For a discussion ofRiesman's ideas, see Norman L.
Rosenberg, Another History of Free Speech: The 1920s and the 1940s, 7 LAW & INEQ. J, 333,
348-54 (1989).
14. See Riesman, supra note 13, at 44 (noting the likely hesitance of the Court to engage in
social policymaking).
15. See id. at 86-87.
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based upon his combination of free speech extremism16 and concern
for material justice (p. 55). Schroeder may have fit awkwardly into
Graber's normative argument because, for reasons that he never fully
explains, Graber limits his focus mainly to political expression, while
Schroeder was concerned primarily with discussion about sex (p. 54).
But Graber also oversimplifies Schroeder's work by exaggerating its
philosophical affinity with the conservative libertarians, thereby avoiding full consideration of Schroeder's importance as a theorist.17
Graber thoroughly and accurately assesses the ideas of other free
speech theorists. Most importantly, the record supports his far-reaching criticisms of Chafee. Reasons exist to question Graber's assertion
that Chafee singlehandedly buried the memory of conservative libertarianism - other scholars played important roles in developing progressive civil libertarianism, 18 and socioeconomic realities may have
dealt the fatal blow to conservative libertarian precepts 19 - but Graber commits no injustice in arguing that Chafee's tactics tended to
obscure the history and weaken the foundation of expression rights.
One revealing fault that Graber does not discuss is Chafee's sycophantic practice, throughout his career, of denigrating the ideas, techniques, and allegiances of the radicals whose freedoms he defended. 20
The repressions of Communist states certainly deserved Chafee's rebukes, and by linking his advocacy of radicals' rights to derision of
their words he may have gained a considerable tactical advantage with
enemies of free speech. But by implying that only the ideologically
pure might defend the liberties of the impure, Chafee's tactic crippled
16. Schroeder believed that the government should punish only speech that actually caused
material injuries; similarly, Graber would hold courts to a very strict standard to convict for
incitement to criminal conduct. Compare p. 56 with p. 231.
17. Seep. 64 (asserting that Schroeder "rel[ied] on the conservative libertarian defense of free
speech"). Analysis of Schroeder's writings about sexual expression reveals that he frequently
cited social benefits, as well as individual self-fulfillment, to support his calls for broad expression
rights. See, e.g., Theodore Schroeder, More Liberty ofPress Essential to Moral Progress, in FREE·
DOM OF THE PRESS AND "OBSCENE" LITERATURE: THREE EssAYS 7, 32 (1906) (claiming that
free sexual discussion would alleviate various social problems and "insure a very general progress
in public morals"). Graber notes this tendency only in an aside and only with respect to Schroeder's more general social views. See p. 57.
18. See MURPHY, supra note 10, at 262-65 (listing liberal practitioners, scholars, and jurists
who joined in Chafee's push for expression rights in the 1920s).
19. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
20. See CHAFEE, supra note 3, at 187 (complaining that radicals' practice of displaying red
flags in public betrayed their lack of "decent respect for the opinions of mankind"); ZECHARIAH
CHAFEE, JR., THE INQUIRING MIND 100-01 (1928) (berating the dullness of the tract that led to
the sedition prosecution in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925)); Zechariah Chafee, Jr.,
Thirty-Five Yean with Freedom ofSpeech, 1 KAN. L. REv. 1, 25 (1952) (describing Soviet representatives to the United Nations as "men who had masks instead of faces" and warning that the
Soviets "have despicable clever allies in our midst"); ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., THE BLESSINGS
OF LIBERTY 112 (1956) (calling radical literature "so wordy, shopworn, and vituperative as to
make reading it a complete waste oftime"); id. at 129 (analogizing communists to "[m]aggots").
Graber does note Chafee's complementary practice of swearing his allegiance to property rights
and the propertied class. See pp. 133-34.
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his libertarian rhetoric. In light of his core belief that expression became punishable when it actually threatened to cause material injury
(p. 149), his politically correct acknowledgement of communist evil
also limited his defense of free speech.21
Graber also does a service by recalling the censorious tactics of
some early twentieth-century progressives. He details how the progressive themes of national discipline and cultural nationalism and the
progressive emphasis on administrative expertise led many would-be
reformers to attack expression inconsistent with their social visions
(pp. 78-86). Graber's analysis may disproportionally emphasize the
illibertarian progressives - he fails fully to explain the reasons that
this group strayed from leading progressives' support for free expression22 - but his analysis of their failings is thorough and convincing.
Graber shows similar acuity in asserting the practical importance
of issues, such as campaign finance reform and media access, involving
the role of material resources in controversies over expression rights.
He goes too far when he implies that repression of lawless speech, civil
libertarians' perennial concern, no longer matters (p. 13) - such repression will threaten freedom as long as there are political demagogues. But his relative priorities appear sound. Although several
thinkers have argued for some degree of government control over material access to expression,23 many contemporary civil libertarians too
reflexively reaffirm their laissez-faire faith without adequately considering the complexities that mixed issues of expression and resources
21. By the 1950s, Chafee premised his defense of radicals' expression on the improbability of
an imminent communist victory. CHAFEE, THE BLESSINGS OF LIBERTY, supra note 20, at 12627 (stressing the small number of communists in the United States). He recognized that economic hardship might cause a growth of American communism, but, ominously, he did not
argue for the continued importance of expression rights under such a circumstance. Id. at 12829. No such compromising defense of free speech could ever hope to overcome McCarthyesque
hysteria.
22. See p. 87 (noting that "[Jane] Addams, [John] Dewey, [Justice Louis] Brandeis and
others maintained that the scientific method would not function efficiently and the community
would not be fully unified unless the polity encouraged citizens to express a wide variety of
opinion on matters of public interest").
23. See LEE c. BOLLINGER, IMAGES OF A FREE PRESS 108-16 (1991) (reviewed in this issue
by Dean Geoffrey R. Stone. -Ed.) (analyzing major Supreme Court cases on broadcast access
and arguing for the benefits of a partial regulatory regime); Thomas I. Emerson, The Affirmative
Side of the First Amendment, IS GA. L. REV. 795 (1981) (surveying settings that arguably require some governmental regulation to ensure opportunities to communicate); Owen M. Fiss,
Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. R.E.v. 1405 (1986) (criticizing the Burger Court's
laissez-faire tendencies in- cases where expression rights collide with economic inequalities and
advocating a significant role for state action in enriching public debate); Donald E. Lively, The
First Amendment at Its Third Century: Reckoning with the Ravages of Time, 18 HASTINGS
CoNsr. L.Q. 259, 284 (1991) ("When the media's own potential for effective agency is implicated, freedom of the press has been pinched to the point that its functional capabilities are
undermined."). Graber does not evaluate Bollinger's and Lively's treatments, which are contemporary to his own; Emerson and Fiss do not satisfy him. See p. 215 (criticizing Emerson, with
Chafee, for "treat[ing] property and free speech as two distinct realms of constitutional discourse"); pp. 211-12 (including Fiss among proponents of the overly simplistic idea that money is
not speech).

May 1992]

American Legal History

1431

present. 24 Graber argues provocatively that Chafee's civil libertarian
structure, which placed economic policy decisions beyond
majoritarian regulation, paralyzed his heirs in an era demanding increased attention to the relationship between money and speech (pp.
159-64). Graber invites his peers to decide for themselves whether
mixed questions of speech and property deserve serious attention but
admonishes them "not [to] tolerate scholarship that asserts these
· problems are of great practical importance but little theoretical interest" (p. 225).
Whether Graber's own defense of expression rights can lead civil
libertarians out of their dilemma remains to be seen. Although his
approach appears thoughtful and workable, its full exposition will
have to address several questions. Most obviously, Graber must explain more clearly how his path to access regulations improves upon
the simple conclusion that "money is not speech." Here, Graber's familiar comparison between restrictions on campaign spending and on
high-decibel amplification, meant to demonstrate that straightforward
campaign finance reform would stretch the Constitution (pp. 212-13),
inadequately supports his portrayal of spending restrictions as a troublesome control on the degree of speech rather than an acceptable regulation of the manner of speech. Similarly, Graber's claim that to
differentiate money from speech necessarily dictates government regulation of other political resources extraneous to the content of political
ideas, such as good looks and eloquence (p. 214), ignores the
nonmarket essence of these qualities. On his other flank, Graber will
need to do more than assert the importance of access issues in order to
placate sworn civil libertarian opponents of speech-related economic
regulations. Moreover, both sympathetic and hostile readers will require a more systematic account of Graber's constitutional philosophy, hastily sketched here (pp. 217-23), which leads him to soften his
advocacy of liberal access to material resources out of reluctant deference to "the direction of the Rehnquist Court" (p. 223).
Whatever the ultimate fate of his theoretical proscriptions, Graber
has delivered a wake-up call to supporters of expression rights who
fear only familiar threats. His critical, probing historical analysis conveys the variety and depth of ideas that have fueled the conceptual
development of expression rights while exposing the flaws in that development. Graber's history supports his insistence that "philosophical and jurisprudential justifications of expression rights are not
timeless verities but reflections of the unique political and·legal climate
24. See, e.g., NAT HENTOFF, THE FIRST FREEDOM 269-82 (1980) (arguing against the fairness doctrine as a simple violation of the language of the First Amendment). Graber notes that
issues combining expression rights and access to material ,resources have caused splits in the
American Civil Liberties Union that have prevented that organization from responding coherently to such questions. P. 206. See also SAMUEL WALKER, IN DEFENSE OF AMERICAN LIBERTIES: A HISTORY OF THE ACLU (1990) (reviewed in this issue by Professor David Cole. -Ed.).
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of their era" (p. 216). He argues forcefully that modem civil libertarians should focus their justifications on mixed issues of expression and
material resources.

- Gregory P. Magarian

